Utah Case Law Update
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Utah Case Law Update
Scott W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General
State v. George M. Martinez, 2017 UT 26
Utah Supreme Court Approves Records Check of Passenger in Vehicle
On May 2, 2017, a unanimous Court held that a records check on a passenger in a vehicle stopped for minor traffic violation, regardless of whether the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by the passenger, is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
FACTS
On December 4, 2013, UHP Trooper Jeremy Horne stopped a vehicle driven by Lonial Milline for an improper turn at 500 West 4600 South in Salt Lake County. Also inside the vehicle as a passenger was George Matthew Martinez, Jr. At the initial contact, Trooper Horne asked for and received ID from both the driver and the passenger. This is a critical fact that impacts directly how the Supreme Court treats the detention of the passenger, Martinez.
Driver comes back clean and receives verbal warning for his bad turn, and is released from detention but voluntarily remains at the scene. Martinez has a warrant and is taken into custody. Incident to his arrest, Trooper finds a glass pipe containing meth residue.
Martinez files a motion to suppress the evidence seized incident to his arrest, arguing the Trooper did not have any reasonable suspicion that Martinez was engaged in any criminal activity, and therefore his detention was illegal. The trial judge originally denied the motion, but upon reconsideration, she concluded that “It was beyond the limited permissible scope of a routine traffic stop for the trooper to run a warrants check on the passenger, Mr. Martinez. Moreover, it was unreasonable for the trooper to do so without as least some minimal suspicion that Mr. Martinez was involved in some kind of criminal activity. Therefore, the warrants check and subsequent search constituted a violation of Mr. Martinez’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the evidence seize from Mr. Martinez is hereby ordered suppressed.”
COMMENTARY
While there may have been a couple of ways for the appellate Court to approach this case, Justice Pearce on behalf of a unanimous panel chooses to keep it simple. While the decision is a good result in preserving officer safety during traffic stops, I caution this audience not to read too much into the Court’s approval of this passenger detention and attempt to create a black letter rule that an officer may
always demand identification from all occupants of any car stopped for a traffic violation. The case simply does not go that far. And so, Justice Pearce means it when he starts out “this case presents a single issue: does a law enforcement officer violate the Fourth Amendment if she requests that a passenger voluntarily provide identification and the runs a background check on that passenger without reasonable suspicion that the passenger has committed – or is about to commit – a crime?” Not to be gender sensitive, but Trooper Horne is a he not a she, but we’ll concede the point in the name of equal time. Also, I don’t know why I am uncomfortable with the court’s reference to what officers do at the time of a stop regarding a person’s identification and status as a “background check” (which seems to me to implicate something greater than a simple electronic records review of license validity and pendency of any legal actions), but again secondary to the crux of our discussion here.
Bottom line – the court focuses on the few extra seconds entailed in obtaining records information about Martinez after he voluntarily surrendered his Utah state ID card upon request, and concludes that “Trooper Horne’s seconds-long extension of a lawful traffic stop did not unreasonably prolong the detention”. For the sake of discussion here, I would expect that this ruling would extend to multiple numbers of occupants in the standard passenger vehicle. So if the car had four or five occupants instead of just two, pretty sure we get the same result.
But what if one of the passengers does not comply with the request to voluntarily provide identification? Would an officer’s demand for identification change the calculus of what is reasonable under these circumstances? Certainly from an officer safety standpoint, that answer would appear to be “no”. But Justice Pearce makes it pretty clear throughout the opinion that he has confined his analysis to a circumstance where the passenger has voluntarily complied with a request from the officer to provide identification. (See footnote 1. of the opinion)
In summary, the case stands for the proposition that the additional time is takes to run records information on a vehicle passenger in not going to unconstitutionally extend the duration of the stop. However, a demand for identification may alter the scope of the stop, unless that officer clearly articulates the safety concerns that precipitate the demand. This is an area not covered by the Terry statutes currently on the books – UCA §§ 77-7-15 and 77-7-16. My recommendation here is to read the case, understanding that it provides another helpful tool to the officer’s investigation toolbox, and don’t inflate the ruling into a cart blanche approval of demanding ID from every occupant of a vehicle that has simply been stopped because the driver made a bad turn or some other traffic offense. I am confident that the court will make the correct analysis when that specific question if presented, but we are not quite there yet.
Be safe out there.